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Abstract
Effective safety management requires the ability to learn from the past and to anticipate the future. Yet 
what we can learn from the past (i.e., accident investigation) and what we can imagine for the future 
(i.e., risk assessment) depends critically on how we think about it, i.e., the models and methods we 
have at our disposal. Accident investigations have long been dominated by a search for causes, either 
as root causes or human errors. Risk assessment has similarly been dominated by static representations 
such as event and fault trees. In both cases the commonly used models and methods have reached their 
limits because the reality of our self-created socio-technical environments has become too complex. 
The alternative is to understand how the variability of human actions is a resource rather than a threat 
and to define safety as a system’s resilience, its ability to adapt and adjust, rather than as the absence 
of adverse outcomes. 
Introduction
Even in the best of all possible worlds, the future is not completely predictable. Events are bound to 
occur for which we are not prepared, some with positive and some with negative outcomes. Although 
there are very few situations where things go wrong compared to the very many where things work out 
fine and where the outcomes are as intended – or at least acceptable under the circumstances – the 
positive  cases  tend on the whole  to  go unnoticed.  When the outcome  of  a task or  an activity is 
acceptable, there is little motivation to look for why that was so; it is simply taken for granted – and 
even considered normal – that things go right. Conversely, when something goes wrong a relentless 
hunt for the cause(s) begins, in order to ensure that such an event never happens again. 
Unless we are willing to treat adversity with Panglossian optimism we must, of course, find some way 
to reduce the uncertainty, especially with regard to things that can go wrong. One venue for that is to 
design processes, systems, and organisations such that hazards are eliminated, or to ensure that the 
probability of adverse events is reduced to an acceptable level. (A hazard is here defined as an event 
that can lead to a known loss.) In order to do so, it is necessary that the system can be described in 
detail and that events develop in a predictable manner. However, since a growing number of socio-
technical systems are intractable, it is in practice impossible to achieve an acceptable level of safety by 
precautionary measures  alone,  i.e.,  by eliminating hazards,  by preventing unexpected event,  or  by 
protecting  against  unwanted  outcomes.  Safety  by  design  (analytical  safety)  must  therefore  be 
complemented by safety by management (operational safety). As resilience engineering makes clear, 
safety is something a system does, rather than something a system has (Hollnagel, Woods & Leveson, 
2006).
Safety by design
The meaning of “safety by design” in this paper is that all possible, or practicable, precautions needed 
to ensure an acceptable level of safety are taken ahead of time. This could be either when the system is 
conceived of or designed, when detailed plans for operation are made, or when it is made ready for 
operation. The engineering parts of the system, namely the technology or hardware, are designed in 
detail and must perforce be configured, operated, and maintained according to meticulously prepared 
instructions. In such cases “safety by design” is not only an option but a requirement. Even so, there 
are limitations to what this can accomplish because technology always is a means to an end rather than 
an end in itself: 
“Clearly not all accidents can be prevented by design. There are some consequences of technology 
that cannot reasonably be predicted at the design stage, particularly in new technologies, using new 
materials  and scientific principles.  However,  once these have led to accidents,  there is  a clear 
responsibility for designers to prevent them in future designs.”
Hale, Kirwan, Kjellen (2007, p. 310)
Yet even if the technology is reliable, and even if it functions in a highly predictable manner, there are 
other problems. For instance, have the safety requirements for the detailed design been adequately 
defined? Are the selected concepts proven from a safety point of view? Or will will it be possible to 
implement  regulatory,  corporate  and  customer  safety  requirements  within  acceptable  cost  limits? 
Although these questions  address  issues  that  have to  do with the  use of  the  system in the wider 
operational context, they are legitimate for “safety by design” as well.
The non-technical parts of the system, namely the people or the liveware, are far more difficult to 
design.  Indeed,  an organisation can never be explicitly designed in the same way that  a piece of 
machinery can, one fundamental reason being that the “components” by their nature are variable and 
flexible, regardless of whether they are considered individually or collectively.  Humans and social 
systems  simply  do  not  function  like  machines,  despite  courageous  attempts  to  make  them do so 
through training, interaction design, and automation. For the non-technical parts the alternative is to 
focus on the operation of the system, and on how it is possible to keep the variability within acceptable 
limits, i.e., by managing safety.
Safety by management
Safety management has during the last decades of the 20th century become a major issue in itself, with 
a number of commercial solutions for safety management systems (SMS) on offer. It may therefore be 
sensible to look beyond the use of SMS as a glib phrase and try to understand what it entails. The 
crucial  point  is  here  the  definition of  safety,  i.e.,  the  definition of  what  the  SMS is  supposed to 
manage. 
Safety management  is,  from a practical  point  of  view, a kind of control;  indeed,  the  meaning of 
‘manage’ is ‘to exert control over, to direct.’ Safety management can therefore be interpreted as the 
control of the organisational functions and practices that together produce safety. The purposes of an 
SMS is to ensure that the organisation’s “safety processes” develop in the indended direction and that 
they are not disrupted or hindered by internal or external events and conditions. This reformulation 
leads to three subsidiary questions. The first is what the organisational “safety processes” really are, 
i.e., what it is that “produces” safety. The second is how these processes can be controlled in practice, 
i.e., how their “speed” and “direction” can be changed. And the third is how the outcome or the result 
can be measured, i.e., what the proper indicators of safety are.
As far  as the  latter  is  concerned,  it  is  common practice  to associate safety with the “freedom of 
unacceptable risk,” or as ICAO (2006) defines it:
“Safety is the state in which the risk of harm to persons or of property damage is reduced to, and 
maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard identification 
and risk management.”
By defining safety in this way, a safe state is defined by the absence of something and the measures or 
indicators  are  therefore  the,  hopefully,  diminishing  numbers  of  negative  events.  The  established 
practice is to try to reach this state through a tripartite approach: to eliminate hazards (by design), to 
prevent  initiating  events  that  may  lead  to  adverse  outcomes  (by constraining  operations),  and  to 
protect against adverse outcomes (by introducing barriers). 
This approach to safety implies a distinction between normal and abnormal operations. The normal 
operations ensure that the (safety) process goes in the right direction and that it produces what it was 
supposed to produce or achieve. The abnormal, or off-normal, operations disrupt or disturb the normal 
operations or otherwise render them ineffective. The main motivation for safety management, as it is 
commonly practiced, has therefore been to prevent such disruptions or disturbances from taking place. 
In that sense safety management has been driven by what has happened in the past, hence been mainly 
reactive.
Theory W
One way of characterising the established approaches to safety and safety management is to propose 
two  idealised  positions,  expressed  as  two  different  theories  called  Theory  W  and  Theory  Z, 
respectively. According to Theory W, socio-technical systems are safe and efficient because:
• The systems are well-designed and scrupulously maintained. 
• The procedures that are provided to operate the systems are complete and correct.
• The operators of the systems, the people at the so-called sharp end, behave as they are expected to, 
and as they have been trained to.
• Designers  can  foresee  every  contingency  and  therefore  provide  the  systems  with  appropriate 
response capabilities.
Theory  W  describes  a  world  of  well-designed,  well-tested,  and  well-behaved  systems.  It  is  a 
characteristic of such systems that there is a high degree of reliability of equipment; that workers and 
managers are vigilant in their testing, observations, use of procedures, and operations; that staff is well 
trained; that management is enlightened, and that good operating procedures are in place. The threat to 
normal performance comes from different types of failures or malfunctions, such as active failures and 
latent conditions, equipment faults, and human error. Safety can therefore be achieved by constraining 
performance variability in various ways (Figure 1).
It follows from the assumptions behind Theory W that performance variability of any kind should be 
avoided. Technological systems are designed to perform one – or a few functions – very efficiently 
and with limited variability. Functions that depend on humans, whether as individuals, as groups, or as 
organisations,  are more versatile but also less uniform and the variability is seen as a threat  or a 
disturbance that may end in performance failures. Everything possible is therefore done to prevent this 
from happening. The change from normal to abnormal operations can happen either abruptly, as when 
something breaks, or gradually in the form of a drift  or slow misalignment  (Cook & Rasmussen, 
2005). The solution according to Theory W is therefore to constrain performance, for instance, by 
means of barriers,  interlocks,  rules,  procedures,  standardization,  interaction design,  norms,  etc.,  or 
even by replacing humans by technology, as in the use of automation. This is supplemented by more 
wide-ranging  activities  such  as  risk  management  (comprising,  e.g.,  hazard  identification,  risk 
assessment,  risk  mitigation,  and  risk  communication),  hazard  and  incident  reporting,  safety 
investigations, safety analyses and safety studies, and safety performance monitoring.
Safety for underspecified systems
Theory W corresponds to systems where the principles of functioning are clear and where there is 
good  predictability.  This  was  not  an  unreasonable  assumption  at  the  time  when  the  currently 
established methods were developed, roughly between 1965 and 1985, but it is much less reasonable 
today. There are two main reasons for that, first that all systems of interest are more or less intractable, 
and second that performance variability is inevitable. 
Figure 1. Safety according to Theory W
Intractable Systems
In  order for  a system to be tractable,  four  conditions must  be fulfilled:  (1)  that  the principles  of 
functioning are known, (2) that a description does not contain too many details, (3) that a description 
can be made relatively quickly, and (4) that the system does not change while the description is being 
made. The last condition is the most important one, and is in a way a synthesis of the three preceding. 
Theory W clearly requires  that  systems  are  tractable.  Many of  the  present  day systems  of  major 
interest for industrial safety are unfortunately intractable rather than tractable. This means that the 
principles of functioning are only partly known, that the description is elaborate and contains many 
details, that it takes a long time to make, and that the system therefore change while the description is 
made. In consequence of that it will be impossible to provide a complete description or specification 
of  the system.  Intractable  systems  are  underspecified in the sense that  details  may be missing  or 
unavailable (e.g., Clarke, 2000). But if a system is underspecified it is clearly not possible to provide 
precise procedures or instructions. The people working in the system, be it at the sharp end or at the 
blunt end, must therefore be able to apply the available prescriptions and procedures to conditions and 
situations that differ from what was assumed. In other words, it is necessary that people are able to 
vary or adapt what they do to ensure that the system functions as required and achieves its operational 
goals.  Performance  variability  –  whether  it  is  called  improvisation,  adaptation,  efficiency-
thoroughness trade-off,  sacrificing decisions,  or  creativity – is therefore necessary,  hence an asset 
rather than a threat.
The inevitability of performance variability
While  machines  and  technological  artefacts  are  designed,  built,  and  maintained  so  that  they  can 
produce a near constant performance – at least until they fail and must be replaced – the same is not 
the case for humans and for organisations. There are many reasons why human performance never can 
be constant or machine-like. One is that physiological functions (muscles, nerve cells, sensory organs, 
etc.) are subject to fatigue, saturation, and accommodation, and that they regularly require a period of 
rest or reconstitution. Many basic psychological  functions, such as attention or vigilance,  are also 
limited with regard to how long they can be maintained at a constant level. A second reason is that 
humans seem to have an innate tendency to vary what they do, often to avoid monotony or to find an 
easier way to accomplish a task. It is this ingenuity and creativity that is at the heart of adaptability and 
of  the  ability  to  overcome  constraints  and  underspecification.  A  third  reason  is  socially  induced 
variability,  for instance in the sense that others will have expectations – or even informal norms – 
about  how  much  and  how little  effort  is  acceptable  in  a  given  situation.  A  different  source  of 
variability  is  the  organisational  culture,  specifically  the  safety  culture.  A  fourth  reason  is  that 
performance depends on the state of the organisation and environment, which may vary in terms of 
demands to work, resources available, etc. A fifth and final reason is the variability due to ambient 
working conditions, for instance temperature, climate, humidity, noise, etc. 
Performance variability is for these reasons inevitable, whether on the level of the individual or the 
organisation.  This  is  fortunately not  a  disadvantage  since  performance  variability  is  necessary to 
overcome the underspecification of large socio-technical systems. But it is a problem if safety models 
and methods fail to recognise that. 
Theory Z
Since most systems of interest today are intractable, it is impossible to provide a complete description 
of them or to specify what an operator should do even for many normally occurring situations. This is 
recognised by Theory Z, according to which socio-technical systems are safe and efficient for the 
following reasons: 
• Humans  learn  to  overcome  the  inevitable  shortcomings,  such  as  design  flaws  and  functional 
glitches.
• Humans can adjust their performance to meet the actual demands of a situation.
• Humans can interpret procedures and apply them to suit actual conditions.
• Humans can detect when somethings fails or goes wrong, and can in many cases correct for it as 
well.
In Theory Z, performance variability is both normal and necessary and is the source of positive and 
negative outcomes – successes and failures – alike. Failures can consequently not be prevented by 
eliminating performance variability,  i.e.,  safety cannot be managed by constraints.  The solution is 
instead  to  identify  the  situations  where  normal  performance  variability  may  combine  to  create 
unwanted effects and to monitor  continuously how the system functions in order to intervene and 
“dampen”  performance  variability  that  threatens  to  get  out  of  control,  cf.  Figure  2.  Conversely, 
performance variability should be accentuated or amplified when it can lead to successful outcomes. 
Thus rather  than looking for  ways  in which something can fail  or  malfunction,  we should try to 
understand the characteristics of normal performance variability,  and specifically how internal and 
external factors may affect the size and nature of the variability.
Safety by management: Resilience engineering
The difference between Theory W and Theory Z corresponds to the difference between a reactive and 
a proactive approach to safety management. If performance variability is both normal and necessary, 
safety must be achieved by managing performance variability rather than by constraining it. This is 
consistent with resilience engineering, which is based on the following principles (Hollnagel, Woods, 
& Leveson, 2006). 
• Performance  conditions  are  always  underspecified,  as  argued  above,  and  individuals  and 
organisations must therefore adjust their performance to the current conditions. Because resources 
and time are finite, such adjustments will inevitably be approximate. 
• For tractable systems, most adverse events can be attributed to a breakdown or malfunctioning of 
components and normal system functions. For intractable systems,  most  adverse events cannot. 
They are instead best understood as the result of unexpected combinations of normal performance 
variability or as the converse of the adaptations necessary to cope with real-world complexity. 
• Effective safety management cannot be based on hindsight, nor rely on error tabulation and the 
calculation of failure probabilities. Safety management cannot be only reactive but must also be 
proactive. Resilience Engineering looks for ways to enhance the ability of organisations to create 
processes that  are  robust  yet  flexible,  to monitor  and revise  risk models,  and to  use  resources 
proactively in the face of disruptions or ongoing production and economic pressures. 
A resilient  system is  defined by its  ability to  adjust  its  functioning prior  to,  during,  or  following 
changes and disturbances so that it can go on working even after a major mishap or in the presence of 
continuous stress. A resilient system accepts a constant sense of unease and remains sensitive to the 
possibility of failure (Hollnagel, Nemeth & Dekker, 2008). The quality of resilience can be defined 
more precisely by pointing to four essential qualities or abilities that a system or an organisation must 
have, cf. Figure 3.
• A resilient system must be able to respond to regular and irregular threats in a robust, yet flexible, 
manner. It is not enough to have a ready-made set of responses at hand, since actual situations often 
do not match the expected situations – the only possible exceptions being routine normal operation. 
Figure 2: Safety according to Theory Z
The organisation must  be able to apply the prepared response such that  it  matches the current 
conditions both in terms of needs and in terms of resources. In terms of the three types of threats 
proposed by Westrum (2006), this is the ability to deal with regular threats. The responses enables 
the organisation to cope with the actual. 
• A  resilient  system  must  be  able  flexibly  to  monitor  what  is  going  on,  including  its  own 
performance. The flexibility means that the basis for monitoring must be assessed from time to 
time, to avoid being trapped by routine and habits. The monitoring enables the system to cope with 
that which is, or could become, critical in the near term.
• A resilient system must be able to anticipate disruptions, pressures, and their consequences. This 
means the ability to look beyond the current situation and the near future, and to consider what may 
happened in the medium- to long-term. In terms of the three types of threats proposed by Westrum 
(op. cit.), this is the ability to deal with the irregular threats, possibly even the unexampled events. 
The anticipation enables the system to cope with the potential.
• Finally,  a  resilient  system  must  be  able  to  learn  from  experience.  This  sounds  rather 
straightforward, but a concrete solution requires consideration of which data to learn from, when to 
learn, and how the learning should show itself  in the organisation – as changes to procedures, 
changes to  roles  and functions,  or  changes to the organisation itself.  The learning enables the 
organisation to cope with the factual. 
Conclusions
Effective safety management requires the ability to learn from the past and to anticipate the future. Yet 
what we can learn from the past (i.e., accident investigation) and what we can imagine for the future 
(i.e., risk assessment) depends critically on how we think about it and on the models and methods we 
have at our disposal. Accident investigations have long been dominated by a search for causes, either 
as root causes or human errors. Risk assessment has similarly been dominated by representations of 
linear combinations of a small  number of events,  such as event and fault  trees.  In both cases the 
underlying assumption is that systems – and events – are tractable. 
It makes sense that models and method would be just about adequate for the typical type of problems 
at the time they were developed. Indeed, there would be little reason to develop a method that was 
more complex or more powerful than required, not least because it would be difficult to imagine what 
that should comprise. New models and methods are developed because existing models and methods 
sooner or later encounter problems for which they are inefficient or inadequate. This, in turn, happens 
because the socio-technical systems where accidents happen continue to develop and to become more 
complex and more tightly coupled. The inevitable result is that any method after a while becomes 
underpowered  because  the  nature  of  the  problems  change,  although  it  may  have  been  perfectly 
adequate for the problems it was developed for in the first place.
The risks that dominate in present day systems have a different aetiology than the risks that dominated 
even one or two decades ago. This has two important ramifications. The first is that it is more difficult 
to understand present day risks – at least until an accident has happened. It is harder to understand the 
“mechanisms,”  because  risks  can  arise  from  non-linear  interactions  among  normal  performance 
Figure 3: Principles of resilience engineering
variability as well as from consequences of failures and malfunctions. And because of that it is also 
more difficult to think of ways to reduce or eliminate the risks, hence to manage safety. 
The second ramification is that many of the established risk assessment and accident investigation 
methods are inadequate for tightly coupled, intractable systems. This dilemma was made clear when 
Perrow (1984) proposed that accidents could be seen as normal, in contrast to risk assessment and 
accident investigation methods that naturally focus on that which is abnormal or dysfunctional. The 
lesson to be learnt from that is that we must continue to evaluate critically the methods that are at our 
disposal. The fact that a method has worked in the past is no guarantee that it will also work in the 
future. Indeed, by the time a method has become adopted as a standard it  is almost  certain to be 
outdated.  The ways  that socio-technical  systems  develop means that  risks can emerge in different 
ways, and that existing methods therefore sooner or later will need to be complemented with more 
powerful approaches. What these will be, no one can say for certain. 
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